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THE PARKING OF AUTOMOBILES
WILLIAM
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It is significant of the modernity of the law of automobiles
that one must for a brief title to this paper resort to a neologism.
To park, literally speaking, is to bring together in a compact body,
within a park or enclosure, objects not in actual service but
held for use when required.' The parking of artillery is a familiar
illustration, and in a similar manner motor vehicles are collected
in "parking places" wherever crowds congregate. 2 In this sense,
as one judge observes, "one automobile can no more park than
one bird can flock. The idea of assembling inheres in the term." 3
But as the word has come to be used in connection with the regulation of traffic and the prevention of excessive congestion on the
highways, it has taken a broader signification. At least figuratively, the stopping of the first car for an unreasonable time is
the beginning of parking, although the policeman who tags your
car would not be interested in such nice distinctions, even in the absence of a definition in the motor vehicle law. To him as to
others, parking, in addition to its original meaning, includes the
voluntary act of leaving'a car standing on the highway when not
4
in use.
The problems connected with parking are essentially administrative problems, among the most difficult that confront the
American municipal corporation. The ever-increasing number
of cars, their habitual use by all classes, and, too frequently, the
inadequacy and inconvenience of other means of transportation,
lead to conditions that call for intelligent regulation in the interest of all who use the streets and highways of our cities and towns;
of those who live there, and of those who come there on business
or for pleasure. The conflicting interests that must be reconciled,
'New Orleans v. Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (19io).
'Ex parte Mobile Light & R. R., 2IH Ala. 525, ioI So. I77 (1924).
'Wilson v. Emery, i Pa. D. & C. 517, 518 (192I).
SKastler v. Tures, 191 Wis. I2O, 2IO N. W. 415 (1926) ; Ex parte Corvey,
220 Mo. App. 602, 287 S. W. 879 (1926).
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as far as possible, are those of automobile operators who seek a
temporary stopping place for their cars, those of carriers of goods
and passengers, as well as others whose interest it is that the highways shall be kept clear for traffic, and those of the owners of
property adjacent to the highway, whose access thereto is impeded. Local conditions are frequently a factor. It may be of
interest to review the cases in which such controversies have come
before the courts.
The regulation of motor vehicles used upon the public highways, whether by residents or non-residents, whether for hire
or for private use, is an attribute of the police power of the state,
and its exercise is nowhere disputed. 5 As Judge Orlady aptly
puts it:

"The state legislature has, beyond question, the power
to provide for the construction and maintenance of the public
highways, whether streets in cities and boroughs, or roads
in townships, and it has a full and clear power to provide
regulations for their use. It must also be conceded that this
power may be delegated without diminution to a local municipality. By which the state imparts to its creature, the municipality, the powers necessary to the performance of its
functions and to the protection of its citizens in their persons and property." 6
Indeed, it has been held that the legislature may absolutely
prohibit the use of motor vehicles, or certain types of vehicles,
upon desiguated highways and streets, or may delegate such power
to local authorities. 7 However, in such case, the authority must
' State v. Caplan, 135 Atl. 705 (Vt. 1927) ; Rutledge Co-Operative Ass'n v.
Baughman, 153 Md. 297, 138 Atl. 29 (927) ; West v. Asbury Park, 89 N. J. L.
402, 99 AtI. i9o (1916); Comm. v. Slocum, 23o Mass. i8o, iig N. E. 687
(i918) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 Atl. 117 (1925) ; Roberto
v. Comm'rs of Utilities, i6o N. E. 321 (Mass. 1928).
Radnor Township v. Bell, 27 Pa. Super. I, 4 (1904).

'Comm. v. Kingsbury, ig9 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848 (I9O8) ; State v. Mayo,
io6 Me. 62, 75 At!. 295 (i9o9); State v. Phillips, io7 Me. 249, 78 Atl. 283
(91io)

; West v. Asbury Park, supra note 5; City of Mascoutah v. Donner, 245

Ill. App. 233 (1924) ; Comm'rs of the Palisades Interstate Park v. Lent, 240
N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1925) ; People v. Waldo, 72 Misc. 416, 131 N. Y. Supp.
307 (191i)

; Perrysburg v. Ridgway, io8 Ohio St. 245, 14o N. E. 595

Smallwood v. District of Columbia, 17 F.

People v. Rosenheimer,

2o9

(2d) 210

(1923)

(Ct. of App. D. C. 1927);

N. Y. 115, IO2 N. E. 530 (913)

semble.

;
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expressly appear and cannot rest on implication." These points
are too well settled and the authorities too numerous to merit
discussion.
On the more limited question, the regulation of parking,
Pugh v. Des Moines 9 best deserves to be considered the leading
case. There an ordinance provided that no person should, between
certain hours, leave .standing on certain streets any vehicle for
a longer period than twenty minutes for loading and unloading.
A bill to restrain its enforcement was brought by the owner of
a private passenger automobile, who was accustomed to drive to
his office and leave his car standing during business hours in the
block where his office was located. His contention was that the
ordinance exceeded the powers of the city and was unreasonable.
The supreme court reversed the decree of the court below granting
an injunction and, after a learned review of the authorities, said:
"We have these propositions established, so far as the
city and the general public are concerned: That the public
streets of a city are dedicated to public use, and are a public
way from 'side to side and end to end,' and that any private
use thereof which in any degree detracts from or hinders
or prevents its free use as a public way to its full extent is,
within the meaning of the law, an obstruction or encumbrance, and any obstruction or encumbrance for private purposes is in law a nuisance." 10
To the argument that the state automobile law enacted that
no municipality could exclude the owner of an automobile from
the free use of the highway, the court replied:
cc*
:we must construe this language to mean that
.
free use which is involved in the right to come and go and
drive upon the streets without let or hindrance. The idea
of the free use of a street does not involve the right to obstruct the free use of the street. If one man, in the exercise
;Walker v.Comm., 40 Pa. Super. 638 (19o9); Clausen v.de Medina, 82
N. J. L.491, 81 Atl. 924 (1911); Barnes v.Essex County Park Comm., 85 N. J.

L. 70, 88 Atl. 837 (1913) ; Eveler v. Atlantic City, 91 N. J. L. 135, lo2 Atl.
898 (1918); Anzalone v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 257 Mass. 32, 153 N. E.
325 (1926).

9176 Iowa 593, 156 N. W. 892 (1916).
'1Ibid. 604, 156 N. W. at 896.
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of his right to the free use of the street, can stable his automobile upon the public street and leave it standing there, any
number of persons can exercise the same right, until a point
is reached where the travel upon the street is absolutely obstructed." 11
A similar argument was made in Beck v. Cox,12 where the
ordinance under attack required any person leaving a vehicle
standing to place it on the right hand side of the street. The
regulation, it was held, came within the charter power to keep
the streets free from obstruction, which, within limits of reason
and fairness, was a subject within the discretion of the city council. The stopping, temporarily and for a reasonable time, of an
automobile in a public street for the convenience of the owner,
is not to be held an obstruction, but one cannot use the street as
a garage contrary to reasonable police regulations. The time,
place and manner of the alleged obstruction must be considered.1 3
Somewhat more difficult questions arise when a local regulation is confined to a particular class of vehicles, such as those
for hire. In Comm.v. Rinker,14 a summary conviction, under an
ordinance placing, on the parking of motor vehicles for hire, restrictions that did not apply to similar private vehicles, was reversed. Under the ordinance, it was observed, one using a hired
automobile could not have it parked near a store or railroad station, while one owning a car could park it to await his convenience. "The ordinance," the court concluded, "which denies the
right to the citizen who rides in an automobile hired for the occasion, which is enjoyed by another citizen, who may own his
automobile, is both unreasonable and discriminatory, and, therefore void." 15 In Texas an ordinance making it a misdemeanor
for any person, owning or using a vehicle conveying passengers
or goods for hire, to "stop, stand or detain" such vehicle on cerIbid. 6og, 156 N. W. at 897.
'77 W. Va. 442, 87 S. E. 492 (915).
3 City of Duluth v. Esterly, 115 Minn. 64, 131 N. W. 791 (9i); Wilson
v. Emery, supra note 3; People v. Harden, no Misc. 72, 179 N. Y. Supp. 732
(1920) ; Ex parte Corvey, supra note 4; Comm.v. Fleming, 8 Pa. D. & C. 708
(1927).

i4 Pa. D. & C. 357
'5 Ibid. 359.

(1923).
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tain streets except when actually engaged in receiving or delivering passengers or goods, was held oppressive and in contravention of common right. 16 So also, in Missouri, an ordinance prohibiting the parking of automobiles carrying passengers for hire
was held void, because the law merely authorized municipalities
to regulate parking and also because it was unreasonable. 1 7 But
by the great weight of authority, there is a fundamental difference
between the use of highways by the public in the usual way for
pleasure or business, and as a place of business or as a main instrumentality for carrying on business for private gain. As to
the former the power to regulate should be sparingly exercised
and only when reasonably necessary to the public interest; as to
the latter the authority to use may be given or withheld. Such
grants are in the nature of concessions by the public, which the
legislature may confer or withhold, extending the privilege to
some persons and denying it to others because of differences of
character or capacity, and defining the terms upon which the
privilege shall be exercised. 18 "There is," says the Supreme Court
of Florida, "a distinction between allowing the parking of ordinary vehicles by the general public along streets and allowing
owners or operators of taxicabs operated for hire to appropriate
a certain portion of a busy street as a location for the conduct
of their private business, where their vehicles are kept in-the intervals when they are not employed in the carriage of persons or
property, and while awaiting, or soliciting, such employment."' 19
The point was made most explicitly as to stage coaches by Lord
" Ex parte Battis, 40 Tex. Crim. App. 112, 48 S. W. 513 (1898) ; explained
and distinguished in Kissinger v. Hay, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 295, 113 S.W. 1005

(i9o8).

'Baker

v. Hasler, 218 Mo. App. I, 274 S. W. 1095 (1925) ; City of New

Orleans v. Badie, 146 La. 55o, 83 So. 826 (192o).
' Melconian v. Grand Rapids, 218 Mich. 397, 188 N. W. 521 (1922) ; State
v. York, go Fla. 625, io6 So. 418 (1925) ; Comm. v. Edmonds, 67 Pitts. L. J.705
(Pa. 1919) ; Sanders v. Atlanta, 147 Ga. 819, 95 S. E. 695 (1918) ; Kissinger v.
Hay, supra note 16; Auto Transit Co. v. Fort Worth, 182 S.W. 685 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916) ; New Orleans v. Calamari, I5o La. 737, 91 So. 172 (1922) ; McGuire
v. Wilkerson, 209 Pac. 445 (Okla. 1922); Swann v. Baltimore, 132 Md. 256,
1O3

Atl. 441 (i9i8) ; Frick v. City of Gary, 192 Ind. 76, 135 N. E. 346

(1922)

;

Harrison v. Big Four Bus Lines, 217 Ky. 119, 288 S.W. 1049 (1926) ; Decker
v. Wichita, 1O9 Kan. 796, 202 Pac. 89 (1921). But see Jitney Bus Ass'n v.
Wilkes-Barre, 256 Pa. 462, 468, ioo Ati. 954, 955 (917).

"State v. York, supra note 18, at 630, io6 So. at

420.

THE PARKING OF AUTOMOBILES

Ellenborough, who characterized it as "making a stable yard of
the king's highway. ' 20 From early times the business of a public
hackman has been held to be affected with a public interest and
subject to governmental regulation. Hence, long before automobiles came into use, ordinances had been sustained authorizing
city officers to prescribe the places where hacks and other vehicles
for hire should stand, particularly in the neighborhood of railroad stations, and requiring drivers to obey the directions of the
police in regard to the places which their vehicles should occupy,
for the prevention of congestion, disorder and the annoyance
of travellers. 2 1 This principle applies equally to motor vehicles
even though in some instances it may confer upon one person a
position of advantage over another, remembering, of course, that
22
such control is not to be exercised arbitrarily and unreasonably.
If vehicles for hire may be assigned to designated parking places
on the highway, it would seem proper that they should be secured
in the use of such positions. Such was the decision in a recent
Massachusetts case, where a conviction was sustained under an
ordinance forbidding the parking of vehicles not taxicabs within
the limits of any taxicab stand. The establishment of public
stands being reasonable and necessary, a further provision was required to make the observance of the regulation possible. "No
right of any citizen is impaired," said the court, "by an ordinance
which prohibits the parking of vehicles at a place in a public street
or highway where such person has no legal title to the land occupied by the street or highway and has no interest in such greater
Rex v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224, 227 (182);
Comm. v. Robertson, 5 Cush.
438 (Mass. 185o) ; Comm. v. Fenton, 139 Mass. 195, 29 N. E. 653 (1885) ; Goodwin v. Hamilton, 6 Pa. Dist. 705 (1897) ; People v. Sewer & Street Comm. of
Saratoga Springs, 9o App. Div. 555, 86 N. Y. Supp. 445 (904).
Comm. v. Matthews, 122 Mass. 6o (1877); Masterson v. Short, 7 Rob.
241, 299 (N. Y. 1867) ; St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364, 7 N. W. 734 (i88o) ;

Veneman v. Jones, II8 Ind. 41, 2o N. E. 644 (1888); Ottawa v. Bodley, 67
Kan. 178, 72 Pac. 545 (i9o3); Taylor v. Roberts, 84 Fla. 654, 94 So. 874
(1922) ; Seattle T. & T. Co. v. Seattle, 86 Wash. 594, 150 Pac. 1134 (1915) ;
Matter of Barmore, x74 Cal. 286, 163 Pac. 5o (1917) ; Yellow Taxicab Co. v.
Gaynor, 82 Misc. 94, 143 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1913).
'City Cab, Carriage & Transfer Co. v. Hayden, 73 Wash. 24, 131 Pac. 472
(1913) ; Kenyon Hotel Co. v. Oregon S. L. Co., 62 Utah 364, 220 Pac. 382
(1923); Henderson v. Bluefield, 98 W. Va. 640, 127 S. E. 492 (1925); cf.
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 24 App. D. C. 458 (i9o4); City of New Orleans v. Badie, supra note 17.
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than an easement of travel which is held in common with all
citizens." 23
Before considering the rights of adjoining owners in connection with the use of the highway, it may be well, in passing,
to mention the rights of such owners in reference to their own
property. That one may park one's car and permit others to park
on one's own land would seem axiomatic unless the parking is
conducted in such a manner as to constitute a nuisance to the
neighborhood. If a garage or filling station may be held a
nuisance, so also may a parking stand. The question depends
upon the nature and result of the acts of which complaint is made,
and not upon the means by which they are produced.2 4 In
Robinson v. London General Omnibus Co., Ltd.,2 5 the turning,

shunting, standing and repairing of motor busses in the street, in
such a way that vibration and noise disturbed the owners and
occupiers of adjoining houses, was held a nuisance. So much
may be conceded without detracting from the owner's right to
use his property as he sees fit. One who stands his car on private
property with the owner's express permission cannot therefore
be brought within the purview of an act directed against the improper use of public streets. 20 In a well-known line of cases it
has been sought to limit the control of railroad companies over
their stations and depot grounds to the extent of preventing them
from giving to one person or corporation the exclusive privilege
of going on the railroad's grounds to solicit transportation of
baggage and passengers, as tending to create a monopoly detrimental to the travelling public. 27

But a great majority of de-

'Comm. v. Rice, 158 N. E. 797, 799 (Mass. 1927).
2 George v. Goodovich, 288 Pa. 48, 135 Atl. 719 (1927);
Huddleston v.
Burnett, 172 Ark. 216, 287 S. W. 1013 (1926); Carney v. Penn Oil Co., 291
Pa. 371, 14o Atl. 133 (1928) ; Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 3o6, 142 Atl. 272 (1928) ;
cf. Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 7o Atl. 6o6 (igo) ; Nevins
v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, io6 So. 597 (1925); Unger v. Edgewood Garage,
287 Pa. 14, 134 Atl. 394 (1926).
=74 Justice of Peace 161 (191o).
'Reamy v. District of Columbia, 273 Fed. 323 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1921);
see Borland v. Curto, 121 Misc. 336, 337, 201 N. Y. Supp. 236, 237 (1923).
'McConnell v. Hays, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892) ; Indianapolis Union
Ry. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 53 N. E. 937 (i899); Montana U. R. v. Langlois, 9
Mont. 419, 24 Pac. 209 (189o) ; Kansas C. T. Co. v. James, 298 Mo. 497, 251
S. W. 53 (923).
See cases cited in Mader v. Topeka, io6 Kan. 867, 189 Pac.
969 (I92O), and Note (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 761.
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cisions hold that such a contract by a railroad is valid, and the
principle has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. 2 8 The station grounds, it is said, belong to the
railroad company, and it may put them to any use that does not
interfere with its duties as a common carrier. The grant of
special privileges to one creates no duty to grant like privileges to
others, nor is the railroad company bound to permit persons having no business with it to enter its premises, solicit trade and use
its property to carry on their own business. It is urged that
such exclusive contracts make for good order at depots, prevent
annoyance, and serve the convenience and the safety of passengers. Possibly this is so, provided an adequate service be maintained. The duty of carriers to dependent services is a problem of
public service law and this special phase of it should not be treated
as an isolated topic. Nevertheless, a railroad's private property
cannot be taken, without compensation, for the purpose of establishing a public taxicab stand.
When the special rights of the private owner of property
abutting on a public street are examined, it will be found that,
while there is some conflict of opinion, at the least his admitted
right to air, light and free access confers upon him an interest in
the highway peculiar to himseli and exceeding that of the general public. 2

9

At the most, and in a majority of jurisdictions, he

owns the fee of the street or highway to the center line, subject
to the easement of travel in the public. At common law, ownership of land adjoining a public road is prima facie evidence of
title to the soil to the middle of the road, 30 although the presump'Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 48 Sup. Ct. 276
(1928); Black & White Taxi & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi & T. Co., 276
U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).

See the many cases cited in the foregoing

opinions, and Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct. 91
(9o); Lehigh V. R. R. v. Graham, 64 Pa. Super. 437 (1916); Missouri P.
R. R. v. Kohler, 107 Kan. 673, 193 Pac. 323 (1920); Thompson's Express Co.
v. Mount, 91 N. J. Eq. 497, IIX Atl. 173 (192o) ; cf. Welsh v. Morristown, 98
N. J. L. 63o, 121 Atl. 697 (1923), aff'd, 99 N. J. L. 528, 122 Atl. 618 (924).
'Greeley S. Co. v. Riegelmann, II9 Misc. 84, 195 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1922);

In re Singer-Kaufman Realty Co., i96 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1922); Fowler v.
Nelson, 213 Mo. App. 82, 246 S. W. 638 (1923); Geunazi v. Marn Co., 263
Pac. 825 (Cal. App. 1928). For the conflicting views in the various states see
4 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1409.
' Cooke v. Green, ii Price 736 (1823) ; Stevens v. Whistler, ii East 5I
(i8og); Marquis of Salisbury v. Great Northern Ry., 5 C. B. (N. s.) 174

(1858) ; Adams v. Saratoga & W. R. R., Ii Barb. 414 (N. Y. 1851).
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tion may be rebutted by the surrounding circumstances. 3 1

Or-

dinarily the fee to the center of the highway belongs to the abutting landowners. The interest of the public is merely a right of
way upon the land for purposes of travel, while the owner retains
his proprietorship of the soil, subject to its undisturbed use by the
travelling public, against whom neither owner nor stranger has
a right to create an obstruction. This is very old law. In 1468
all the justices are reported as agreeing "that in the king's way,
the king has nothing except the passage for himself and his people, but the freehold and all the profits and trees belong to the
lord of the soil." 32 Modern cases reiterate this principle. In
Hicknan v. Maisey,3 3 the plaintiff had rented land, crossed by a
highway, to a horse-trainer. The defendant, after notice not to
do so, went on the highway, observing with glasses and taking
notes of the trials of race horses. The defendant was held to be
a trespasser and enjoined from repeating the acts complained of.
The right of the public to pass and repass on a highway, it was
said, was subject to reasonable extensions which may from time
to time be recognized as necessary in a country becoming more
populous and civilized, but they must be such as are not inconsistent with the paramount idea that the right of the public is that of
passage. In Vondersmnith's Case,3 4 a hackman standing in front
of a hotel was ordered to leave and was arrested on his refusal
to do so. He charged the officer with assault and battery, but the
latter was released on habeas corpus. "No one," said the court,
"has a right to stand or carry on any business in front of any
man's house, and if he is thus annoyed and notifies the party to
2t
Mappin Bros. v. Liberty & Co., Ltd., [193] I Ch. ii8; Headlam v.
Hedley, i Holt 463 (1816).
IY. B. 8 Edw. IV, f. 9,pl. 7 (1468) ; Y. B. 2 Edw. IV, f. 9, pl. 21 (1462);
Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange 1004 (1734) ; Goodtitle v. Alker, I Burr. 133
(757) ; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 BI. H. 527 (795) ; Stackpole v. Healy, i6 Mass.
33 (i8i) ; St. Mary, Newington v. Jacobs, L. R. 7 Q. B. 47 (1871) ; Robert v.
Sadler, 104 N. Y. 229, ION. E. 428 (1887) ; Burr v. Stevens, 9o Me. 500, 38
Atl. 547 (897) ; Breisch v. Locust M. C. Co., 267 Pa. 546, zio At. 242 (1920).
[I9oo] i Q. B. 752; Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 9 L. T. 384 (1863);
Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, [1893] I Q. B. 142; Queen v. Pratt, 4 E. & B.
86o (i855).
I io Amer. L. J.523 (Pa. i85I) ; cf. Lewis v. Jones, i Pa. 336 (x845);
Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Pa. 355 (871); Benner v. Junker, i9o Pa. 423, 43
Atl. 72 (i899) ; Hopkins v. Catasauqua M. Co., i8o Pa. 199, 36 Atl. 735 (1897).
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leave and he don't, he has a perfect right to use sufficient force
to compel the offender to go.

.

.

.

His refusal to go gave

the °proprietor a right to take him by the collar and put him
off the pavement, or call a public officer to do so, which was the
wiser course." 35 One has been held to be a trespasser who stood
on the sidewalk in front of a man's house and used towards him
abusive language, not having stopped for a justifiable purpose.
"Suppose," it was added, "a strolling musician stops in front of
a gentleman's house, and plays a tune or sings an obscene song
under his window, can there be a doubt that he is liable in trespass?" 36 The traveller on the public highway has admittedly
a right to stop, and may, in case of necessity, load or unload or allow his vehicle to remain a reasonable time for his own convenience, if he does not unduly interfere with the rights of others
in their use of the highway. The occasional stopping or standing of
carriages or wagons near abutting property, not continued an unusual or unnecessary length of time, is spoken of as an appropriate
use of the highway. 3 7 But there is no right to make continuous
use of the highway in front of private property as a standing
place for one's vehicles, and to cut off or obstruct access to the
property, or otherwise interfere therewith, so as to constitute a
nuisance. 38 It would seem then that, at common law, to leave an
automobile constantly standing at the side of the highway in front
of private property, against the will of the abutting owner, without
authority of law or ordinance, is a trespass where the fee of
' Vondersmith's Case, supra note 34, at 523.
'Adams

v. Rivers, Ii Barb. 390, 398 (N. Y. 1851); State v. Buckner,

Phill. 558 (N. C. 1868); Cook v. Dolan, 6 Pa. Dist. 524 (1897); Huffman v.
State, 21 Ind. App. 449, 52 N. E. 713 (i8g8) ; State v. Davis, 8o N. C. 351
(1879); In re Heffron, 179 Mo. App. 639, 162 S. W. 652 (1913). Driving
cattle to a ditch in front of the plaintiff's premises for drinking purposes is a
trespass, not being a mere incidental turning aside while being rightfully driven
along the highway. Van Roy v. Watermolen, 125 Wis. 333, IO4 N. W. 97
(905).

n O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292 (Mass. 1838); Murray v. McShane,
52 Md. 217 (I879); Duffy v. Dubuque, 63 Iowa 171, i8 N. W. goo (1884) ;
Smethhurst v. Barton Square Chulrch, 148 Mass. 261, ig N. E. 387 (i889);
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Loughman, 26 Ind. App. 359, 59 N. E. 872 (Igoo); Nead
v. Roscoe L. Co., 54 App. Div. 621 (N. Y. I9OO) ; Cordano v. Wright, 159 Cal.
6Io, 115 Pac. 227 (911).
'Reynolds v.Clarke, i Pitts. Rep. 9 (Pa. 1853); Lippincott v. Lasher, 44
N. J. Eq. 120, 14 Atl. IO3 (i888); Turner v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148 (188o).
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the highway is in such owner, and, perhaps, a nuisance where he
has but an easement. Can city or state confer such authority?
It has been laid down many times, in controversies foreign
to the point now under discussion, that neither the legislature
nor the municipal authorities can sanction such a use of a public street or highway as will interfere substantially with the rights
of the adjacent owners, without compensation, whether they own
the fee of the street or their interest is in the nature of an easement. 3 9 These rights are, principally, the right of access, frequently called that of ingress and egress, the right to light and
air, the right of view, and the right to have the street or road
kept open as a public highway, for the benefit of the abutting
property. So far as the protection of these special interests is concerned, it seems, in practice, to matter little to most courts whether
the abutter owns the fee to the center of the highway or not; in
either case they are safeguarded as property.4" Similarly, in the
cases relating to parking, a precise definition of the true nature
of the abutting owner's right is seldom required for his protection. It may be conceded that a license from the municipality
to carry on a general business on the highway will not justify the
licensee in establishing himself thereon in such a way as to constitute a nuisance. Thus the continual maintenance of a lunch
wagon in a public street, obstructing access to the adjoining
property, was held a nuisance, giving an abutting owner specially
injured the right to sue for an injunction, although the defendant
conducted his business under a city license. 4 1 "The easement ac"State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 201 (0870); De Geofroy v. Merchants'
Bridge Co., 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386 (1903) ; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185
(188o) ; McDonald v. Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. 136, 7 Atl. 855 (1886) ; St. John v.
Mayor, 3 Bosw. 483 (N. Y. 1858); Lancaster v. Reisner, i4 Lanc. L. Rev. 193
(Pa. 1897) ; Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384, 41 So. 9o,
8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 226 (i96) ; Matter of Hofeler v. Buck, 1o Misc. 402, 18o
N. Y. Supp. 563 (1920) ; i ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) §488;
13 R. C. L. 168; 4 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 29, § 1425.
'0Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182, i9g N. W. 219 (1924) ; In re
Olinger, 16o App. Div. 96, 145 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1914); Peace v. McAdoo, 46
Misc. 295, 92 N. Y. Supp. 368 (19o5) ; First Nat. Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459,
32 So. 144 (19O) ; Opinion of the Justices, 2o8 Mass. 603, 94 N. E. 849 (I9H) ;
see Bohm v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 129 N. Y. 576, 587, 29 N. E. 8o2, 8o4

(1892).

" Strong v. Sullivan, i8o Cal. 331, I81 Pac. 59 (1919).
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quired by the public," it was said in a similar case, 42 "includes
every reasonable means of transportation for persons and commodities, and of transmission of intelligence, which the advance
of civilization may render suitable for a highway. . . . It
may well be that the present instrumentalities or methods of travel
do not necessarily exhaust the range of uses to which highways
may be put, but the acts of the defendant do not belong to the
class of purposes for which ways have been established." Where
a city granted to an individual, in consideration of a money payment, a permit to keep his wagon, when not in use, in the street
in front of his shop, and an injury resulted therefrom to a third
person, the city was held liable in damages for maintaining a nui43
sance.
Is the establishment of parking spaces in front of private
property a legitimate use of the highway? In Branahan v. Hotel
Co.,44 a hack stand, established by ordinance of council in front
of the plaintiff's hotel, obstructing the street in front of shops
occupied by the plaintiff's tenants and interfering with access,
was enjoined. The city, said the court, had no power to appropriate the easement of an adjacent owner to private use, without
compensation.
"This permanent occupancy of the streets, cutting off
access to plaintiff's store rooms, for the convenience and benefit of a private business, cannot be justified on the plea that
the public who use hacks are accommodated more readily
and on better terms. . .
The same would, doubtless,
be the case with other kinds of business located in the
streets." 45
Another group of cases upholds the validity of ordinances
authorizing the establishment of specially licensed cab stands in
"Comm. v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 203, 83 N. E. 415, 416 (19o8); cf.
Matter of Fiegle, 36 Misc. 27, 72 N. Y. Supp. 438 (igoi) ; Galloso v. City of
Sikeston, 124 Mo. App. 380, ioi S. W. 715 (i9o7) ; Spencer v. Mahon, 75 S.C.
55 S. E. 321 (1906).
'Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700 (1889).
"39 Ohio St. 333 (1883) ; McDonald v. Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. 136, 7 Atl.
855 (1886) ; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 22 S.W. 898 (1893) ; Lancaster
v. Reisner, supra note 39; Ewbank v. Yellow Cab Co., 84 Ind. App. 144, 149

232,

N. E. 647 (1925).
"Branahan v. Hotel Co., supra note 44, at 335.
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favor of designated operators, with the written consent of the
abutting property owners. Without that consent, it is said in
McFallv. St. Louis,4 6 the city would have no power nor authority

to authorize hack and carriage drivers to stand their horses and
vehicles upon the streets in front of abutting private properties,
and thereby obstruct the ingress and egress. But, in a Virginia
case, 47 the court, in upholding such an arrangement, did not wish
to be, understood as deciding that the ordinance would be invalid
without the clause requiring the consent of the abutting owner,
provided it was so worded as to prevent interference with his
rights. Provisions in ordinances requiring the consent of the
owner of property in front of which it was proposed to maintain
a taxicab stand, before a permit would be granted to the applicant,
have been held reasonable. It has been said that:
"The number of applicants for consent to maintain
taxicab stands in front of a given hotel or depot may be so
numerous that, if all were granted, the space reasonably available therefore would be overcrowded and the street congested
so as to interfere with the right of the public to the use of
the street, as well the right of the owner or manager to
free ingress or egress." 48
On the other hand, in Illinois an injunction to restrain the
maintenance, in front of railroad property, of a hack stand established by ordinance, was refused, and in Ohio an ordinance,
making it unlawful for the operator of a vehicle to park in front
of a railroad station without permission from the person having
the supervision of the station, was held invalid as a delegation of
power, and discriminatory in its operation.4" It seems needless to
observe that an abutting owner cannot, by lease or permit, grant
the use of part of the street in front of his property to another,
so as to confer special privileges upon one who is otherwise entitled to use the street only upon terms equal with others similarly
Mo. 716, 135 S. W. 51 (1910).
'Long's Baggage Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S. E. 355 (1926).
" Ritchbart v. Barton, i93 Iowa 271, 277, i86 N. W. 851, 853

"0232

Mader v. Topeka, sstpra note

(1922);

27.

" Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 II. 289, 54 N. E. 825 (1899) ; Cincinnati
v. Cook, 107 Ohio 223, 14o N. E. 655 (1923).
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situated. 50 And this is true although the owner may be entitled
to privileges in the highway in front of his premises to a somewhat greater extent than the general public, such as temporary
occupation in connection with his business, o.r a reasonable use
for the purpose of receiving or expediting the departure of guests,
which does not unnecessarily interfere with the public use, or
conflict in other respects with proper municipal control.51
In New York, in I886, the proprietor of a hotel at Saratoga Springs was allowed by the supreme court to recover damages from a liveryman for injuries sustained through the standing
of the defendant's horses and carriages in front of the hotel,
and an injunction was granted against a continuance of the prac.ice, the court refusing to receive in evidence an ordinance declaring that portion of the highway in front of the plaintiff's
premises a stand for hacks. ". .
the legislature had not the
power, neither had the municipal authorities," said the court,
"as against the adjoining owner, to confer upon any person
the
right to make use of the highway, for any other purpose than to
pass and repass, without the consent of the owner of the fee." '52
The principle of the decision, however, is limited to cases where
the fee of the highway remains in the abutting owner, by the
Court of Appeals in Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of New
York. 5 ' There an injunction pendente lite, to restrain officials
of the city from enforcing an ordinance which authorized the
' Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, supra note 40; Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago,

supra note 49; New York v. Reesing, 77 App. Div. 417, 79 N. Y. Supp. 331
(1902); Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118, 21 So. 452 (1896) ; Pagames v.
Chicago, III Il1. App. 590 (i9O4) ; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 24 App.
D. C. 458 (1904); U. S. Restaurant Co. v. Schulte, 67 Misc. 633, 124 N. Y.

Supp. 835 (19io); New York Taxicab Co. v. Hawk & Wetherbee, 63 Misc.
555, 125 N. Y. Supp. 220 (19io) ; City of New Orleans v. Badie, supra note IV;
Boiland v. Curto, 121 Misc. 336, 814, 201 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1922),
"Willard Hotel Co. v. District of Columbia,

23

App. D. C. 273 (19o4);

Gassenheimer v. District of Columbia, 25 App. D. C. 179 (19o5) ; People v.
Brookfield, 6 App. Div. 398, 39 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1896) ; Odell v. Bretney, 62
App. Div. 595, 71 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1goi), aff'd, 38 Misc. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67

(19M2); Willis Cab Co. & A. v. The Abbaye, 67 Misc. 568, 124 N. Y. Supp.
756 (191o) ; People v. May, 98 Misc. 56I, 164 N. Y. Supp. 717 (1917) ; Greeley
S. Co. v. Riegelman, 119 Misc. 84, 195 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1922).
'McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun 117, 119 (N. Y. 1886) ; Masterson v. Short,

7 Rob.

299

(N. Y. 1867), ibid. 241 (preliminary injunction denied).

N. Y. 97, 105 N. E. 8o3 (1914), aff'g, 159 App. Div. 888 (913),
aff'g, Yellow Taxicab Co. v. Gaynor, 82 Misc. 94, 143 N. Y. Supp. 279 (913).
W212
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mayor to locate and designate as public hack stands the space
alongside the curb, adjacent to various public buildings, including
hotels, with the further provision that no stand should be designated within fifteen feet on each side of the entrance to any building on the adjacent property, was refused. The order was affirmed in the supreme court and the Court of Appeals. It was
urged that an ordinance which permitted the municipal authorities,
without the consent of the proprietors, to establish a hack stand on
Thirty-fourth Street in front of the hotel premises, infringed
rights of the abutting owner which could not be appropriated
without his consent, except upon payment of just compensation.
The city of New York owns the fee of the land occupied by the
streets, its tenure being in trust for street uses, 54 and, although it
was urged that this was of no consequence, the court thought
otherwise, and found that there was a distinction between the
rights of a mere abutter and the rights of an owner in fee, the
former having no right to compensation for an added burden so
long as it was not exclusive or excessive. The dissenting judges
in the supreme court thought the abutter had a right to insist
that the street in front of his premises be kept clear of all permanent obstructions such as this cab stand would amount to, because the ordinance contemplated the continuous presence of
vehicles, and its practical effect would be to keep a permanent line
of hacks in front of the hotel, without the consent and against
the will of the proprietor. The Court of Appeals, however, did
not feel that the public hack stands provided by the ordinance
involved an appropriation of the roadway, and declined to hold
that the general provision for an open space of thirty feet in front
of hotels and other buildings was so inadequate as to render the
ordinance void as a matter of law. If a case arose in which
the prescribed space was actually insufficient, and the hack stand
unreasonably obstructed access to a hotel, the proprietor could seek
redress in the courts against the particular method of enforcing
the ordinance which led to results infringing upon his rights. The
standard of what had proved convenient in the past, it was sug" Kane v. New York E. R. R.,

125

N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278 (i891).
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gested, furnished a ready test of what constituted a reasonable
exercise of power under the ordinance.
In the foregoing case, as well as in the others of the same
type just discussed, it will be noticed that the abutting property
was operated as a hotel, a public calling, but nothing is made
of this in the opinion of the court. It is significant that in the
ordinance under attack the mayor was authorized to locate public
hack stands only alongside the curb adjacent to public buildings,
railroad stations, steamship and ferry landings, hotels, restaurants
and theatres; places where experience indicated that a number of
cabs would be needed. There is, nevertheless, nothing to indicate
that, in a jurisdiction where the abutting owner has no more than
an easement in the highway, the principle of Waldorf-Astoria
Hotel Co. v. City of New York 55 might not be applied to residential or other property, provided the right of access were protected. In Matter of Hofeler v. Buck,5 6 where news stands on
the sidewalks were held nuisances, the hack stand case was distinguished from the case at bar "by the fact that the use of a hack
is incidental to the purpose of a street which is primarily for
travel. This also applies to the temporary parking of automobiles." In a built-up city, where traffic conditions are acute,
it will seldom be practicable, or even possible, to establish a stand
for cars to park in front of private property without measurably
interfering with the adjoining owner's easement. Where the
common law rule prevails and the title of the owner extends to
the center of the highway, the power of the municipality to impose an additional burden on the property in the form of a cab
stand has been denied. in McFall v. St. Louis,57 and is at best
doubtful. The eminent domain cases are so conflicting as to be
of little help. As put by the Supreme Court :5s
"The right of an owner of land abutting on public
highways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the
Supra note 53. In Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, supra note 49, the fact
that a railroad company was in many respects a public corporation and amenable
to public control was taken into consideration.
' Supra note 39, at 568, i8o N. Y. Supp. at 412.
"Supra note 46.
Sauer v. New York, 2o6 U. S. 536, 548, 27 Sup. Ct. 686, 69o (i9o7).
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courts of all the States, and the decisions have been conflicting, and often in the same state irreconcilable in principle.
The courts have modified or overruled their own decisions,
and each state has in the end fixed and limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of abutting owners in
accordance with its own view of the law and public policy."
The street railway cases are among those that make it very
difficult to draw the line between uses which constitute an additional servitude and those which do not, the tendency being to
extend the right to use new means of locomotion as an improved
method of travel and in furtherance of the ordinary use of the
highway. "When the highway is not restricted in its dedication
to some particular mode of use," said Judge Cooley, "it is open
to all suitable methods; and it cannot be assumed that these will be
the same from age to age, or that new means of making the way
useful must be excluded merely because their introduction may
tend to the inconvenience or even to the injury of those who continue to use the road after the same manner as formerly." 5' However, in the opinion of one learned commentator, it is difficult to
resist the conviction that the rights of the owners of the fee
are unjustly impaired by the rules which some of the decisions
sanction. 60 There is also an essential difference between the easement of the public in an urban and a suburban highway. The
control of cities over the surface of their streets, with a view to
the safety and convenience of travel, is necessarily extensive,
whereas the power of the counties is more limited."1 The congestion of city traffic makes this distinction especially important
in the regulation of vehicles. In a modern municipality the
question of control is complicated by the fact that there may
be found streets of more than one type; some where the fee is
owned by the adjacent owners, others owned wholly by the city,
'Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212, 217 (1876); Magee v. Overshiner,
150 Ind. 127, 49 N. E. 951 (1897) ; Rafferty v. Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579, 23
Atl. 884 (1892).
8 2 ELLIorr, op. cit. supra note 39, § 886; 3 DI.LoN, MuNICl'AL CORPORATIONs (5th ed. 1911) § 1167.
6I ELLIOTr, op. cit. supra note 39, § 496; Colegrove W. Co. v. Hollywood,
151 Cal. 425, go Pac. 1053 (1907) ; Dempster v. United Traction Co., 205 Pa.
70, 54 Atl. 50l (1903).
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due to differences in the form of dedication or the title acquired
62
in condemnation proceedings.
It may conceivably be urged that a city, in the course of its
general control of the streets, and in order to expedite the movement of traffic, has power to establish parking places at the side of
the highway for the use of public and private vehicles, and that
the abutting owner cannot complain, so long as he has free access
to the premises, of a use of the highway that is rather a regulation and extension of common practice than the imposition of a
new and additional burden upon property. But the old protest
against making a stable-yard of the king's highway was no more
cogent than the contemporary objection of shopkeepers or householders to the establishment, in front of their premises, of a free
garage for any thrifty stranger who happens along, on property
concededly his for all purposes other than the public's easement of
passage. It is unlikely that a city council would go so far as to
create expressly parking places for private cars in front of private
property without the adjoining owner's consent. If such were
the case, viewers in proceedings for the opening of streets should
take into account this prospective inconvenience as a factor in
estimating damages. Yet, indirectly, this is commonly assumed
to be the effect of ordinances which, by forbidding parking on
certain streets or on one side of a.street, impliedly authorize the
use of the unrestricted areas. On such an assumption solid lines
of cars daily and nightly fill every inch of the allotted space, but
the cases have not yet informed us of the legal consequences.
Would an ordinance be held to be a reasonable exercise of the
police power, which places permanently the burden of receiving
parked cars on the properties on one side of the street, while the
fortunate owners on the opposite side are relieved of such burden?
In Paris parking is on alternate sides of the street on alternate
days, an impartial arrangement, but one that in this country
would probably be regarded as unduly fatiguing to the minds of
the drivers and police. While the point is undecided, conserva'Hobson v. Philadelphia, 15o Pa. 595, 24 At. 1048 (1892). It is common
practice in settling claims for damages on the opening of streets to require a
deed of the fee from the owner.
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tive opinion would probably hold that ordinances authorizing
general parking in designated places on certain highways are
permissive only; that they constitute no more than a waiver by
the municipality of any objections to the standing of vehicles in
the specified areas, but subject to the legal rights of the adjoining owners, whatever they may prove to be. Otherwise the'
municipality might subject itself to damage claims greatly exceeding the cost of a free municipal garage or parking place for its
casual guests, if some litigious citizens should succeed in proving
this practice to be an invasion of their property rights, thereby
opening a new path for raids on the city treasury.
Violations of parking regulations, once the violations are
proved, offer no special procedural difficulties. They are punished, as other offenses against motor vehicle laws and ordinances
are punished, by indictment or summary proceedings, illustrations
of which will be found in the cases previously cited. 63 In a recent
New York case it has been held that proof of ownership of an
automobile found in a restricted zone raises a presumption that
the owner was in possession and control, which continues until
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. 4 In addition to
these statutory remedies, any unauthorized obstruction which
unnecessarily impedes the lawful use of the highway is a public
nuisance at common law, for which an indictment is an appropriate remedy,66 or a bill in equity for an injunction by the public
authorities. 66 Private citizens who are specially injured by an
obstruction of the highway may sue for damages, 67 and may also
'Duluth v. Esterly, 115 Minn. 64, 131 N. W. 79i (I9II); People v.
Harden, I1o Misc. 72, 179 N. Y. Supp. 732 (1920); Comm. v. Newhall, 2o5
Mass. 344, 9I N. E. 2o6 (igio) ; Stephens v. District of Columbia, i6 App.
D. C. 279 (i9oo); HUDDY, AuTo o ams (7th ed. 1924) C. 29; BERRY, AUTOmOBiLES (5th ed. 1926) c. 35; BABBITT, MOTOR VERc1.s (3d ed. 1923) c. 23.
Buffalo v. Thorpe, 132 Misc. 307, 23o N. Y. Supp. 187 (1928).
King v. Russell, 6 East 427 (1805) ; Rex v. Cross, supra note 20; Comm.
v. Milliman, I3 S. & R. 403 (Pa. 1825); People v. Cunningham, I Denio 524

(N. Y. 1845) ; Davis v. Bangor, 42 Me. 522 (1856) ; Turner v. Holtzman, 54
Md. 148 (188o); Pastorino v. Detroit, 182 Mich. 5, 148 N. W. 231 (914);
cf. King v. Justices of Yorkshire, [igio] I K. B. 439.
SSparhawk v. Union P. Ry., 54 Pa. 401 (1867); Attorney General v.
Brighton & Hove Co-op. S. Ass'n, [i9oo] I Ch. 276; Alabama W. R. R. v.
State, 155 Ala. 491, 46 So. 468 (i9o8).

Milarkey v. Foster, 6 Ore. 378 (1877).
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maintain a bill in equity where their substantial rights are affected
in such a manner that they cannot be adequately compensated in
damages.6 8 In such controversies familiar principles of the law of
nuisance are applicable. Statutes and ordinances requiring vehicles to park or stand in a particular manner are intended
to facilitate the safe passage of persons and vehicles using the roadway, and to prescribe safeguards for those
coming within the sphere of danger. Disregard of the statutory safeguards is a breach of legal duty and may give rise to a
cause of action for negligence. In a recent California case the
violation of a city parking ordinance, which resulted in a collision causing injury to the plaintiff, was held negligence per se,
rendering the defendant liable in damages when the wrongful act
was the proximate cause of the injury.6 9 In another recent California case, where a truck was parked at the intersection of a
street, so as to obstruct pedestrian travel in violation of a city
ordinance, the owner was held liable for the death of a child who,
while attempting to go round the truck, was struck by a car
operated with care.70 But in New Jersey, where a child ran
from behind a truck parked on the wrong side of the street and
was killed, the illegal parking was held not the proximate cause
of the accident.7 1 A similar view is expressed in New York,
where the fact that a coal truck stopped with its left side to the
curb in violation of an ordinance, did not render the owner liable
for the death of a child caught by a hook hanging from a chain
at the side of the truck. There was nothing, said the court, to
'8Butler v. Penn Tobacco Co., 152 N. C. 416, 68 S. E. 12 (igio); Santa
Fe Town-Sife Co. v. Norvell, 187 S. W. 978 (Tex. Civ. App. I916); Lippincott
v. Lasher, supra note 38; Goodwin v. Hamilton, 6 Pa. Dist. 705 (1897) ; Germaine v. London Exhibition Co., 75 L. T. iOi (1896) ; Elias v. Sutherland, 18
Abb. N. C. 126 (N. Y. I886); Benjamin v. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 400 (1874);
Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887) ; Flynn v. Taylor, 127
N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418 (1891); Manley v. Leggett, 62 Hun 562, 17 N. Y.
Supp. 68 (1891) ; JoYcE, LAW OF NUISANCES (1906) § 218.
'Flynn v. Bledsoe Co., 267 Pac. 887 (Cal. App. 1928); but cf. Colvin v.
Auto Interurban Co., 132 Wash. 591, 232 Pac. 365 (1925) ; Dare v. Boss, iii
Ore. 190, 224 Pac. 646 (1924); Watt v. Associated Oil Co., 123 Ore. 50, 26o
Pac. 1012 (1927); Bradley v. Clarke, 219 Ky. 438, 293 S. W. lO82 (1927);
Wall v. Cotton Co., 115 So. 69o (Ala. 1928) ; Forster v. Consumers S. Co., 174
Minn. 105, 218 N. W. 249 (1928).

'Winsky v. De Mandel, 266 Pac. 534 (Cal. 1928).
' Powers v. Standard Oil Co., 98 N. J. L. 730, ii9 Atl. 273

(1923).
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show that the position of the chain was in any way connected
with the rule of law that vehicles must proceed and stop with their
right side toward the curb.7 2 A city, it may be added, is not liable
73
for failure to regulate the parking of cars by ordinance.
Compared with the great number of cases on many other subjects connected with the use of motor vehicles, the number of
decisions on parking is inconsiderable, although plentiful enough
to indicate in outline the duties and privileges of those concerned.
That outline will no doubt be filled in as policies become better
defined and practices settled with reference to this method of
transportation, still in its legal infancy. In spite of an occasional
harsh word from a traffic officer, the attitude of the public, of
property owners, officials, and habitual users of the highway has
been, on the whole, good-tempered and free from insistence on
technical rights. Nearly everyone drives a car, nearly everyone
dislikes to pay a garage fee, and to wait the seemingly interminable number of seconds that it takes to get in or out of a garage
or parking stand. We like to perpetuate, in this age of machines,
the easy-going ways of the pioneers. But the automobile is an
instrument of power which will be selfishly used, like the tomahawk and chariot, until, by the attrition of conflict, a Modus
vivendi is established that adapts it to its proper place in the
scheme of things mundane.
'Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpenter; 247 N. Y. 365, i6o N. E. 400 (1928).
Bradley v. City of Oskaloosa, I93 Iowa xo72, i88 N. W. 896 (1922).

